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The Legacy of Forced Migrations in
Modern Turkish Society :
Remembrance of the Things Past ?1
Nergis Canefe
1 In  the  era  of  post-industrial  capitalism  and  amid  new  patterns  of  globalisation,
international  migration is  the  norm rather  than the exception regarding  population
movements. In the economic sphere, complex population movements taking the form of
labour migration within and across the state borders constitute a primary mechanism
alleviating supply and demand pressures2.  In the political  sphere,  on the other hand,
population movements generally assume a darker face. During the twentieth century, the
largest number of people moved across state borders due to population exchanges and
forced  migration.  These  kinds  of  population  movements  tend  to  function  as  quick
remedies for problems around political legitimacy and instability in both weak and strong
states. Furthermore, certain sectors of the society seem to be disproportionately affected
by them3.  Recent comparative work in migration studies prove not  only that  ethnic,
religious and racial factors have a systematic appearance in out-migration flows, but also
that ethno-religious minorities are particularly prone to be displaced4. 
2 The topic of this paper is the legacy of the forced migration of ethno-religious minorities
in and out of Asia Minor that took place during the initial stages of the nation-building
process in modern Turkey. The examination provided here has a particular focus : the
remembrance of the life and times of Orthodox Christian communities that once lived in
Asia  Minor.  Rather  than  being  a  celebration  of  Turkish  society’s  return  to  its  past,
however, the present work problematizes the selective use and presentation of refugee
memories. The Republic of Turkey is a relatively young nation-state. Meanwhile, since its
foundation in 1923, the intense struggle the Republican cadres undertook to establish the
legitimacy of the new regime has hardly lessened. In this work, I argue that part of the
reason for this ongoing crisis of historical identity in modern Turkish society is the denial
or  only  partial  recognition  of  both  the  causes  and  the  effects  of  the  large-scale
demographic  re-shuffling that  took place during the closing decades  of  the Ottoman
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Empire.  In  this  respect,  I  propose  that  the  nostalgic  return to  the  days  of  Ottoman
Anatolia and the longings for harmonious multiculturalism in modern Turkish society
remain unbalanced in terms of the perception of the Turkish national past. From the mid-
nineteenth century  onwards,  there  existed  a  specific  set  of  socio-cultural  conditions
under  which  ethno-religious  difference  created  a  subset  of  people  whose  lives  were
uniquely traumatized by nascent nationalist ideologies in the Ottoman Empire. As such, it
was not only the Ottoman Christians residing in Asia Minor who were affected by the
demise  of  the  Imperial  system  and  the  burgeoning  of  new  nation-states.  The  new
revisionist  movement  fails  to  pay  attention  to  this  fact  and  underestimates  the
significance of the massive influx of Muslims of various pedigree from the Balkans and
the Caucuses into the Ottoman heartlands prior to or during the departure of Ottoman
Christians from Asia Minor. In the following pages, I reach the conclusion that unless the
picture of forced migration in and out of Ottoman Anatolia is recaptured in its totality,
popularised reiterations of the sad exodus of Ottoman Christians offer little insight for
the  current  problems  ailing  Turkish  society  around  issues  of  cultural  and  religious
tolerance, political pluralism and civic ideals of nationhood.
3 Mass population movements are a challenge to the generic nation-state model based on
the assumption of a culturally homogeneous citizenry. Meanwhile,  we can identify at
least three patterns according which national polities are affected by regular waves of
migration. Traditionally immigration-based societies such as USA, Canada and Australia
have standardised procedures for acquisition of citizenship by the eligible newcomers.
They,  by  definition,  are  obliged to  accept  a  multi-ethnic /  multi-religious  population
composition as the foundation of their societies. Western European democracies, on the
other hand, were and still are subjected to successive waves of both labour migration and
population flows from their ex-colonies. And yet, there is a strong tendency in European
societies  to  err  on  the  side  of  a  discourse  of  cultural  purity.  Consequently,  for  the
majority of European societies,  acquisition of citizenship has long been a contentious
issue and there are frequent referrals to the “true” spirit of the nation in mainstream
political  rhetoric.  Finally,  we  have  societies  made  up  of  various  ethno-religious
communities but whose “national identity” stresses ethno-religious unity and commonly
overlooks the ingrained heterogeneity of the national polity. Turkey constitutes a hybrid
case squeezed between the aforementioned second and the third categories. Therefore,
there are grounds to test the applicability of the developments in European societies
regarding the acceptance and legitimation of the heterogeneous make-up of the national
polity. Indeed, a relatively recent debate concerning international migration, citizenship
and nationalism within the Western European context looms large in the Turkish context,
as well. This debate can broadly be titled as the post-nationalist discourse. The realisation
that “Europe for the Europeans only” is not a viable promise led to a serious revision of
views  concerning  the  characteristics  of  cultural  and political  life  in  major  European
societies.  Despite the restrictions imposed upon foreigners and visitors regarding the
length of their stay, their travel and residence rights, and of course their participation in
social, cultural and political spheres, selective labour migration, refugees and the long-
term settlement of migrants from ex-colonies are now deemed as an integral--as opposed
to being imposed or temporary--part of European social and political life5. As a response
to  this  contradiction  between  European  self-image  and  European  realities,  since  the
1990s, alternative suggestions are being made regarding the status of settled immigrant
communities irrespective of their inclusion by European citizenship laws. In this new
context, full access to citizenship rights are no longer seen as the sine qua non of political,
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social and cultural participation and integration6. Especially in the field of international
studies, there is a tendency to generalize the terms of this primarily European debate and
to argue for the inherent multi-culturality and hybridity of all societies regardless of the
formal structures dictating admittance to citizenship7.
4 Meanwhile, as this work proves, there are also grounds to propose that the euphoria
about tolerant multi-culturalism is slightly out of context in the Turkish case. The crust
of the problem concerning the identity of the modern Turkish nation rather concerns
Turkish society’s misgivings about and dealings with its own history. There still remains a
demarcation line drawn between the native born, the naturalised, and the alien, based on
ethno-religious  attributes.  Therefore,  the appeal  to  cultural  rights,  group rights,  and
selective  exercise  of  political  rights  as  a  panacea  for  issues  relating  to  the  lack  of
legitimacy of the Republican regime yields only limited results. Hundred of thousands left
their ancestral homelands in Asia Minor as a result of forced migrations at the onset of
the Republic.  Similar numbers also arrived to Asia Minor again as a result  of  forced
migration movements, and were resettled. Therefore, there is an inherent “applicability
problem” regarding Turkish society’s perceptions of multi-culturalism and tolerance. The
dominant assumption that modern Turkish society is composed of a Muslim majority of
clear Turkish ethnic ancestry underwrites the significance of both in and out migration
across Asia Minor at the onset of the Turkish nation-state. In parallel, the human costs of
forced migration and population displacements implicated by the Republican regime and
its immediate predecessors remain a buried issue.  The foundational phase of Turkish
national  history  exemplifies  the  identification  of  indigenous  minority  groups  with
distinct  ethno-religious  identity  claims as  threats,  and their  targeted elimination via
demographic reshuffling. Denial or selective granting of citizenship rights came as part
and parcel of this package. Consequently, both members of ethno-religious minorities
who left and those who arrived in Asia Minor are more often than not barred from having
access to their own history and ancestral land. In this context, in societies like Turkey
that  are  ethno-religiously  diverse  in  reality  but  claimed  to  be  homogeneous  by
authoritarian nationalist ideologies, acquisition and protection of citizenship remains as
the sine qua non for the establishment of inclusive regimes and general enjoyment of
relative  social  peace.  In  order  for  multi-culturalism to  flourish,  Turkish  culture  and
politics has to witness the coming to terms with the Republic’s past outside the sanitised
parameters of the narrative of national independence. 
 
Remembrance of the Things Past ? Revisionist
Accounts of the Life and Times of Ottoman Society of
Asia Minor
5 Since the early 1990s, the Turkish market for popular culture has been filled with an
abundance of  products  depicting the  particular  cultural  richness  and ethno-religious
colorfulness of late Ottoman society. These include collections of Rembetika or Sephardic
Jewish songs, hymns of the Greek Orthodox Church, Ottoman music in the immediate pre-
Republican period clearly carrying the mark of  multi-denominational  influences,  oral
history accounts of the past of the remaining families of Christian pedigree in modern
Turkey, architectural and urban historical revelations about the multi-ethnic and multi-
religious background of Ottoman cities and towns, series of chronicles and memoirs of
Ottoman Christian refugees, depictions of inter-communal life in Ottoman Anatolia as
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well as in the major cities of the Empire such as Constantinople and Smyrna as they were
known, translations of works on minorities in the Ottoman Empire, and auto-biographical
stories by Armenian and Greek writers about their birthplaces, childhood, ways of life,
and of course their catastrophic exodus and uprooting.8 The emergence of this trend of
“remembrance of the things past” coincides with daring albeit not always consequential
attempts towards the establishment of political pluralism and cultural pluralism in the
civic  sphere.  As  a  totality,  this  appears  as  a  promising  picture  regarding  the  self-
understanding and historical identity of the modern Turkish society. 
6 However, especially on the remembrance front, the presented narratives come forward as
far too circular, self-referential and largely devoid of gruesome or contentious details.
There  seems  to  have  a  “moral  of  the  story”  in  each  case,  but  it  is  not  necessarily
applicable to the understanding of our past. Whichever catastrophic events took place,
these are portrayed as serious misfortunes and traumas without obvious or identifiable
perpetrators. The blame is on violent nationalist rhetoric, culture of intolerance, forced
circumstances dictated from “high up” in the state or military bureaucracy. Houses may
be  demolished,  communities  uprooted,  property  looted  and  confiscated,  churches
defaced,  relationships  severed,  lives  lost,  but  the  human  actors  involved  in  these
violations  are  largely  absent  from  the  revisionist  accounts.  Furthermore,  the
presentations tend to be either highly personal or individual cases. Unless one puts a
mark on the map after attending to each manuscript or record, it is rather difficult to
have a general sense of where these Christian communities lived, what their numbers
were,  their  political  and  economic  involvements,  class-structure,  etc.  The  revisionist
literature  and  products  aim  at  consolidating  a  generalised  culture  of  tolerance  for
difference and civic citizenship based on common residence and adherence to common
ideals9.  The  past,  in  this  context,  is  treated as  a  fable.  Its  characters  are  mythically
beautiful and elusive, its events only accountable as passing glimpses, while the lessons to
be learnt from it have primarily a futuristic dimension. Looking back for the sake of
reaching a better understanding of history is not necessarily included in this agenda of
revitalisation of memory.
7 In the larger Turkish context of obsession with national history and heightened worries
about the legitimacy and continuation of the Republican regime, these aims and products
fall short of providing new outlets for addressing some of the key issues regarding the
foundational identity of the modern Turkish nation. Is this a nation built upon war not
only against imperialist Western powers but also against religious minorities ? Is this a
nation built up of multiple ethnicities and cultures sharing the Muslim faith and some
linguistic commonalities or simply a grandiose conglomeration of “Turkish people” ? Is
this a nation united together in its faith in the Republican regime or did the regime acted
as a  buffer  against  the unwanted vestiges  of  a  multi-denominational,  multi-linguistic
imperial  Ottoman  system  with  myriad  kinds  of  inter-communal  tensions ?  What
happened to the land and property of millions of Christians that left Ottoman Anatolia
with no promise of return ? Who moved into their houses, who tilled their land, who took
care of their orphans ? Who replaced them in the financial, cultural and social spheres ?
These are only some of the questions that remain unanswered or even totally avoided by
the revisionist movement. Their avoidance is partly due to the factor of blame that would
be cast upon the parents and grandparents of the current generation of Turkish youth. Or
else,  they would bring to the surface all  other kinds of  memories of  where many of
today’s Turkish families initially arrived from and under which conditions they made Asia
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Minor their new homeland. This, in turn, would force the credibility of Turkish national
history to its limits as its focal point is the rebirth of the Turkish nation assumed to have
been resident in Anatolia and Thrace for centuries.
8 In this context, there are three issues that need to be opened up for debate regarding the
current uses and presentation of memories pertaining to inter-communal life, exodus and
multi-culturality in what was Ottoman Anatolia. First and foremost, the general historical
background to the demographic make-up of Asia Minor is to be reinstated. Second, the
politics of multiculturality in the Ottoman Imperial realm demand critical examination.
Finally, the distinct characteristics of the socio-economic position of Ottoman Christians,
particularly Orthodox Greeks as they are the most popular group for both the producers
and consumers of revisionist accounts, have to be acknowledged. The combined effect of
the addition to this enhanced background to the accounts of a pre- or early-Republican
past would be not only its de-romanticisation. It would also involve introduction of real
life actors into these stories of departure and severance. Furthermore, it could indeed
show the human face of the perpetrators of forced migrations, as well. We still need more
stories and accounts of Muslim migrants expelled from the Balkans and the Caucusus,
Muslim businessmen not allowed to exercise their trade or not able to break into the
circles  of  international  finance  and  trade  dominated  by  non-Muslim  counterparts,
Muslim religious leaders, soldiers and bureaucrats not willing to share power or allow the
bringing down of old, rigid hierarchies in Ottoman society, and intellectuals of various
background not content with what the Imperial legacy symbolised in the world at large
and yearning for a recapture of their sense of pride and achievement. However, with the
provision of an informed introduction to revisionist accounts, one is at least one step
closer to making sense of all the suffering and loss, not only in terms of empathising with
“the other”, but also in terms of reaching a better understanding of how one arrived at
where one is today and at what cost.
 
Historical Context : Demography, Geography and Other
Givens
9 The  current  political  rhetoric  suggests  Turkey  is  a  land  of  “99  percent  Muslim”
population. Revisionist accounts, on the other hand, suggest that Ottoman Anatolia was a
truly polyglot society where ethno-religious communities of multiple backgrounds lived
together. The historical facts lie somewhere in between. Christian communities of Asia
Minor had a long history in what was known as “Ottoman Anatolia” well into World War I
10. However, there was also a large Muslim population among whom the ethnic Turkish
element was dominant. In this context, it is imperative that the somewhat fuzzy picture
of harmonious inter-communal coexistence is replaced by a more accurate account of the
demographic make-up of the late Ottoman society.
10 As already suggested, the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire was by no means
homogeneous despite the fact that ethno-linguistic differences among the Muslims have
generally been overridden for administrative purposes11. During the nineteenth century,
Anatolian Muslim communities were mainly composed of Turks, Kurds, Greek speaking
Muslims  (Laz)  and  a  small  number  of  Arabs.  To  these  groups,  later  on  joined  the
Caucasian  Muslims  emigrating  from  the  Russian  territories  and  Balkan  Muslims
emigrating from the newly established nation-states in the region12.  In terms of gross
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figures, however, Muslims of Turkish ethnic descent constituted the largest ethnic group
13. Both Ottoman sources and censuses of the Turkish Republic suggest that Muslims of
Arab  ethnicity  inhabited  mostly  the  south-east  of  the  Asia  Minor  land  mass,  Kurds
traditionally lived in the east, and Laz communities were found in the north and north-
east. Peoples of Turkish ethnicity were found in every region, although they were the
predominant group in Central Anatolia. Similarly, immigrants arriving from the Balkans
and the Caucuses were strategically scattered around all parts of Anatolia.
11 The population distribution of Anatolian vilayets according to the 1330 (1911-1912) census
also suggests that virtually all provinces had settled Greek and Armenian communities14.
Christian communities of Asia Minor included Greeks and Armenians (Orthodox, Catholic
and Protestant), Catholic and Orthodox Assyrians, Chaldeans and Nestorians of Anatolia,
and, several others in small numbers such as Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians and Romanians.
There were also marginal communities practicing religious heterodoxies, syncretisms and
different varieties of crypto-Islam15. The crucial fact is that these communities did not
constitute  “compact  minorities”  with  identifiable  borders  that  divided  Anatolia  into
ethno-religious  enclaves.  Rather,  Ottoman  Anatolia  was  a  historic  example  of  inter-
communal existence,  with al  the blessings and problems that come with it  within an
Imperial  context16.  Furthermore,  the  majority  of  the  Christian  communities  that
remained in Asia Minor well  until  the establishment of the new Turkish nation-state
inhabited this land for centuries.  Under the Ottoman reign, non-Muslim communities
were acknowledged and incorporated into the imperial order under the rubric of the
millet system. As illustrated in the next section, the costs and benefits of this political
arrangement are open to debate. However, what matters in the context of demographic
and geographic givens is that under the millet system, religious minorities by and large
remained in their ancestral lands. During the break-up of the Empire and later the hey-
days of national self-determination, on the other hand, they first became immigrants and
refugees. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, they then became subjects of
international treaties proposing population exchanges for the homogenisation of newly
established  nation-states.  In  particular,  the  political  turmoil  between  1914  and  1922
permanently  changed the human geography of  both Asia  Minor  and portions  of  the
Balkan peninsula17. Finally, in the era of Republican Turkey, those who remained within
the newly drawn borders became the religious minorities of Turkey, protected by laws
and international treaties on paper but living in a precarious situation in reality18. 
12 In the course of their changing status,  the total  population of Christian communities
diminished  radically.  Admittedly,  a  reliable  comparison  of  Ottoman  and  Republican
Turkish statistics on Christian communities is by no means an easy task to achieve. To
begin  with,  population  figures  belonging  to  specific  Christian  communities  living  in
Anatolia during the pre-1923 period remain controversial to this day. During the Ottoman
period, as a general rule Christians were tallied neither by ethnicity nor by language but
only by religious denomination. This meant that ethnic and linguistic differences largely
remained  unaccounted  for19.  Population  estimates  on  ethno-religious  groups  of  the
Empire  are  thus  derived  from  suggestions  of  European  scholars  or  emissaries,  who
traditionally relied upon religious leaders' counts or self-estimates by the communities20.
During  the  Republican  era,  the  censuses  did  include  entries  on  mother  tongue  and
religion up to 1965. However, ethnicity was not used as an entry. Consequently, neither
before 1923 nor after 1965 do we have reliable and organised data that could reveal the
changing  population  dynamics  within  ethnically  distinct  Christian  communities.
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Meanwhile,  the  period  between  1923  and  1965  provides  significant  information  for
educated  estimates  based  on  a  combination  of  data  on  mother  tongue  and  religion.
Within this period, the first full-fledged Republican census taken in October 1927 is a
particularly  important  source  of  information  revealing  population  composition  in
Anatolia and Thrace following the upheavals of the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the
Turkish War of  Independence21.  In its  basic method of  enumeration,  the 1927 census
repeats the tradition of Ottoman censuses and primarily focuses on the male populace. As
a result, it underestimates the total population. It also suffers from deficiencies in the
enumeration of the eastern provinces. In the meantime, what is valuable and new about
the 1927 census is the fact that it categorises the entries according to “Population by
Place of Birth” and “Population by Mother Tongue”. These two categories, combined with
the category of religion, provide a general picture of refugees arriving in Turkey as well
as a rough estimate of those who left Anatolia. Taking into consideration the correction
factors for the total figures, the Muslim population of Anatolia in 1927 was 14 184 381 out
of the total of 14 589 14922. This is a substantial increase from the total figure of 11 618 550
in 1922. The difference is primarily due to Muslim in-migrants from the Balkans arriving
to various provinces between 1922 and 1927. As to the total Christian population, the
1911-1912  Ottoman  census  figures  suggest  that  in  Anatolia  as  a  whole,  17 %  of  the
population was non-Muslim. Out of the total of 17,5 million inhabitants, this percentage
amounts to a figure of close to 3 million people. Needless to say, the difference between
the 1927 estimates for the non-Muslim population of 404 768 and the 1911-1912 figures of
close to 3 million signals drastic changes in demography and politics between World War
I and the founding of the Republic of Turkey. 
 
The Political Context : From Empire to Nation-State
13 Political historians of the Middle East argue that across the region, the condition of the
state  envisioning  its  nation  is  a  common occurence.  During  this  process,  competing
nationalist  movements challenged each other's national  narratives and counterpoised
their  own  ethno-religious  uniqueness.  Therefore,  traditionally  ethno-religious
distinctiveness came to be identified with politically volatile “compact minorities”—that
is,  communities concentrated in often geopolitically defensible and defined areas23.  In
reality,  however,  ethno-religious communities  show a great  more variation than this
stereotype of irredentist-separatism suggests. They can be in the position of a majority as
well  as a minority,  dominant,  subordinate,  or in alliance with others.  Similarly,  their
membership of a chosen group, community or polity may or may not overlap with clear
territorial boundaries. They may be united by a vision of a common racial and linguistic
descent, belief system and confessional practices. And yet, they are equally prone to be
divided  by  internal  primordial  ties,  tribal  membership,  linguistic  or  denominational
differences, cultural cleavages, familial linkages and regional attributes. Indeed, internal
conflict and divisions reflect the predicament of Christian communities of Asia Minor
more than the politically volatile suggestions of “Greek” or “Armenian” threats to the
Empire and later to the Turkish nation-state. 
14 With the rise of Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian, Arab and subsequently
Turkish nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Christian communities of Asia Minor no
longer belonged to a working political order. Changing circumstances commanded that
they make choices concerning their political loyalties, citizenship and nationality, and
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eventually their place of residence. In the larger, regional context, the ending of the millet
system coincided with political expressions of the resentment of Turkish preeminence.
Consequently, successive nationalist regimes embarked upon demolishing the remnants
of Ottoman legacy24. The interwar period (1914-1945) in particular signifies the territorial
destruction and total annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. Political changes in this period
laid the foundations of a new state system in both the Balkans and the Middle East. By the
1960s,  territorial states  of  a  post-imperial  and  post-protectorate  era  were  already
parading as the nation-states of the foreseeable future25. Meanwhile, up until the present
day, problems around ethno-religious minorities and political pluralism remain largely
unresolved.  Beneath  the  surface  of  formal  institutional  continuity,  bureaucratic  and
military  strength,  and,  central  rule  lie  the  troubled  waters  of  political  and  cultural
integration as well as recurrent waves of ethno-religious unrest. 
15 Retaining the allegiance and securing the loyalty of ethno-religious communities to the
state and central government is crucial for political stability and establishment of
legitimate  rule.  However,  some  regimes  resort  to  a  short-cut  and  opt  of  radical
demographic re-arrangements such as forced migration or cleansing of select minorities.
What  would  be  the  foundations  of  a  people's  claim  for  nationhood  under  such
circumstances ? While factors such as population size and ethno-religious or linguistic
homogeneity,  economic  resources,  military  strength,  or  structures  of  bureaucratic
centralisation shed light on the mechanisms of state-building, they illustrate little about
the distinct character of a national polity and the citizenship contract it embraces. In this
larger context, although the term itself has been contentious since the critical work of
Braude and Lewis, the principles behind the Ottoman millet system provide critical clues
about the backbones of many a national revival movement across the Balkans and the
Middle  East.  The  millet system,  whether  a  coded  term  used  primarily  in  foreign
correspondence by the Ottoman state26 or a socio-political reality larger than the dictates
of Ottoman central bureaucracy27, was the key administrative tool developed to account
for the ethno-religious diversity within the borders of  the Empire.  It  allowed a high
degree  of  flexibility  around  issues  of  language,  religion,  ethnicity,  distinct  cultural
practices and local customs while achieving an effective level of centralisation for the
incorporation  of  various  communities  into  the  imperial  administrative,  political  and
economic system28. Indeed, as many Ottoman historians argued, the actual practice of the
regulations and restrictions that came with this political system exhibited a great degree
of variation depending on the individual situation of a given non-Muslim community as
well as the personality and politics of local administrators. As a result, ethno-religious
communities  who  were  clustered  into  Greek,  Armenian  or  Jewish  millets  with  large
administrative  brush-strokes  remained  more  or  less  independent  in  their  linguistic,
ethnic  and  local  religious  affairs.  These  separate  communal  and  religious  identities
ascribed by the millet system then delivered a vocabulary of cultural uniqueness to the
cadres of nationalist revolutionaries across the Empire. The young nation-states of the
late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century  burgeoning  across  former  Ottoman
territories aspired to the modern notion of a territorially sanctified secular state while
simultaneously enhancing exclusively defined ethno-religious identities29. 
16 The  first  major  millet,  the  Orthodox  Rum,  was  established  in  1454.  The  Orthodox
Christians of Asia Minor, the Middle East and the Balkans were thus brought together
under a single religious authority. The Armenian millet with its own patriarchate was
established in 1461. Unlike the Greek Orthodox community, the Armenians did not have a
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patriarchate  in  Constantinople  before  the  Ottoman  conquest30.  Their  ecclesiastical
centers were the See of Etchmiadzin and the See of Cilicia. Then the Jewish millet was
founded as yet another pillar in Ottoman administration.  The Chief  Rabbinate of  the
Ottoman Empire, however, did not survive the “centrifugal pressures” resulting from the
large-scale Jewish immigration from the Iberian peninsula and ceased to be the single
authority for all the Jewish communities with different cultural and linguistic traditions31
.  In  this  early  order  of  things,  the  Greek  and  Armenian  communities  represented
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the West and the East,  respectively.  The
patriarchates  in  Constantinople  assumed  a  central  position  vis-à-vis all  other
patriarchates due to their proximity to the Palace and thus to the heart of  Ottoman
bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the Greek and Armenian patriarchates were not furnished with
rights to infringe upon the ethno-linguistic integrity of the multiplicity of communities
under their jurisdiction.  They were ordained to function in the manner of “umbrella
organizations”. As numerous ancient churches of the East were included in the Ottoman
territories,  Copts,  Maronites,  Jacobites  and  other  smaller  and  unorthodox  sects  of
Christianity  entered the  domain of  Ottoman rule.  The  autonomous  survival  of  these
various ethno-religious communities were guaranteed by a highly developed system of
local administration based on rural or town quarter representation. In this context, the
basic organizational unit of the millet system was not larger than the family-unit within a
given  community32.  Indeed,  the  millet system  cannot  be  identified  with  significant
territorial  divisions  compared  to  administrative  or  political  units  such  as  the  eyalet.
Instead, it accounts for an abstract mapping of the ethno-religious communities within
the  Ottoman  territories.  Consequently,  the  millet system  simultaneously  encouraged
religious universalism and administrative parochialism.
17 Meanwhile, the millet system was a mixed blessing in areas other than efficient imperial
administration. To start with, in conjunction with the regular practice of sürgün (planned
and  selective  forced  migration)  pursued  to  provide  a  “balanced”  distribution  of
communities  across  the  vast  geography  of  the  Empire,  the  Ottoman  administrative
apparatus has often been accused of a benign neglect towards the communal autonomy of
non-Muslims  and  their  right  to  their  ancestral  lands  and  property33.  Similarly,  the
devsirme system based on the periodic levy of unmarried male children from the Christian
peasantry of the Empire to be trained as Ottoman soldiers and bureaucrats after their
conversion to Islam is  commonly identified as an absolute abridging of  the rights of
Christian communities living under the Ottoman rule. Finally, the constitutional basis of
the Ottoman millet system was the Islamic principle of recognition of the “Peoples of the
Book”,  which accorded them protection as  dhimmis34.  The  term “religious  tolerance”
usually indicates the willingness of a dominant religious community to live side by side
with members of other faiths35. In the case of the poly-ethnic Ottoman state, however,
religious  tolerance  was  offered  to  the  “People  of  the  Book”  if  and  when  they
unequivocally recognised the primacy of Islam and the supremacy of Muslims. In this
sense, the main noteworthy feature of the millet system appears to be the identification of
non-Muslims as a category of Ottoman subjects divided within themselves according to
their attachment to one of the three main faiths recognised by the Ottoman state well
into the nineteenth century (Greek and Armenian Patriarchates and Jewish Rabbinate).
Furthermore, it is commonly argued that although Greeks, Armenians and Jews had the
same status as subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, there was a substantial difference in terms
of how they came under such authority,  and how they were treated from that point
onwards. The Sephardic Jews migrated to the Ottoman lands for protection whereas the
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Greek and Armenian communities became subjects of Ottoman authority as a result of
military conquests and invasions. Therefore, as far as cultural memories were concerned,
the dictates of the millet system did not suffice to override the nationalist fervor of the
nineteenth  century  to  create  a  tradition  of  equality  among  cohabiting  confessional
communities. Instead, its emphasis on confessional distinctions insured a continued sense
of  ethnic  and  political  separateness  and  unequal  access  to  power  based  on  such
differences. Differing and sometimes hostile perceptions of other non-Muslims among
Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities,  dictated by religious biases and conflicting
views  of  their  communal  histories  and  attachment  to  land,  further  clouded  inter-
communal relations36. Competing economic interests among non-Muslim communities as
well as between Muslims and non-Muslims was yet another significant factor mitigating
intercommunal  friction,  particularly  among  members  of  the  classes  engaged  in
commerce, finance and trade. 
18 On the question of how long the millet system stayed in effect, arguments vary. However,
there is common agreement that its inevitable death was signalled by the erosion of the
distinct position of non-Muslims in 1856 in exchange for equal rights to all  Ottoman
subjects37. The subsequent process of absolute centralisation of state power that started
with the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire came together with politics of cultural
and linguistic homogenisation that targeted the former millets38. With the establishment
of the Republican regime in 1923, remaining Ottoman Christians were added into the
“religious minorities” of Turkey. In the Lausanne Treaty (1923), they were accorded the
right to speak their communal language, and to maintain and perpetuate their religion39
.However,  the  Jacobin  logic  espoused  by  the  cadres  of  the  secular  Turkish  Republic
favoured their total or near-total assimilation. As studies on Jewish, Greek Orthodox and
other  non-Muslim  communities  indicate,  however,  patterns  of  assimilation  of  non-
Muslim communities did not exactly follow what was envisaged by the new Turkish state
40. The dissolution of a once-widespread network of local communities following waves of
emigration  and  compulsory  population  exchanges  brought  about  the  formation  of
compact minority communities. Among the Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities of
Istanbul, communal structures led to the development of mechanisms of closure in order
to perpetuate these group’s linguistic and religious identity in a rapidly changing and
ethno-religiously  homogenised  Turkish  society.  Particularly  after  the  1960s  and  the
massive  forced  exodus  of  Greeks  of  Istanbul,  the  combination  of  bureaucratic
secularisation in Turkish society and a rise of Islamic ideologies in the political arena fed
into the formation of self-affirming and yet simultaneously insecure gestures among the
remaining non-Muslim communities. Consequently, once espoused by the millet system
for  the  purposes  of  “good governance”  under  the  Ottoman rule,  religious  difference
became a legal stigma ordaining the lives of Christian communities in Republican Turkey.
Even  with  their  ever  diminishing  numbers  in  select  metropoles  and  their  aging
population, they are still far too visible, and all for the wrong reasons. 
 
The Greek Christian Communities of Asia Minor
19 The last  of  the  critical  issues  to  be  discussed with reference to  the  revitalisation of
“refugee memories” in modern Turkish society concerns the socio-cultural and political
characteristics  of  the  life  of  Greek  Orthodox  communities  under  Ottoman  rule.  The
agreed  upon  revisionist  sentiment  about  their  forced  departure  is  that  it  created  a
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cultural lacuna as well as an economic loss in post-Ottoman Turkish society. Meanwhile,
the reasons for  the growing unease among local  and newly settled Muslim populace
concerning the status of Ottoman Christians come forward only in the more traditionalist
and nationalist literature and memoirs. Similarly, the changing and at times conflicting
aspirations  of  Ottoman  Greeks,  as  well  as  the  divisions  and  clashes  within  these
communities,  are  addressed  mostly  in  passing.  This  gap  in  both  knowledge  and
understanding has to be closed to make sense of  what prompted the massive forced
exodus of historic communities to be overseen not only by rings of Independence fighters
or  later,  soldiers  of  the  new  Turkish  Republic  but  also  by  their  neighbors,  friends,
customers,  business relations and former allies  in local,  regional  or imperial  politics.
Otherwise, history is prone to repeat itself albeit in different contexts as the lessons from
it are yet to be learnt. 
20 Until the end of the eighteenth century, Greek Orthodox communities of Asia Minor and
the Middle East distinguished themselves based on three overlapping cultural worlds41.
The most circumscribed and immediate of these was the local community within which
an individual was born to and raised. It provided a sense of identity via its traditions,
customs and social structure. Those who left their immediate communities and migrated
elsewhere could still remain as part of it by retaining its particular customs and keeping
the memory of their “place of origin” live. The second world of culture for an Ottoman
Orthodox  Greek  was  that  of  the  larger  confessional  community.  It  symbolized
commitment to a particular religious belief and to the hierarchical order that came with
it.  The  world  of  Greek  Orthodox  Church  was  not  bound by  time  or  space,  as  one's
immediate  local  community  was.  Nor,  given  the  immense  ethnic  diversity  of  Greek
Orthodox Christians scattered around the Empire, did it exclusively use the language of a
particular ethnic group. In addition, the Church suffered from a peculiar tension within
the institution itself. On the one hand, it bore the historically significant authority of
Byzantine Hellenism. On the other, it was bound by the authority of the Ottoman Empire
and was therefore reduced to be part  of  the larger mosaic of  millets dictated by the
imperial  political  system.  Consequently,  although  essential  for  the  Greek  Orthodox
identity,  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  was  characterised  more  by  paradoxes  than  by
certainty. The third realm that shaped the life of Ottoman Greek Orthodox communities
was what gradually became crystallised as the “Hellenic culture” by the advent of Greek
nationalism. Initially, it was primarily defined in terms of language. Later on, however,
territorial  boundaries  became  the  primary  consideration,  particularly  after  the  1821
Greek Revolt and the establishment of a Hellenic state42. 
21 As  the  Ottoman  state  began  to  show  clear  signs  of  internal  fragmentation  and  an
independent Greek state became a political reality, there was a fundamental change in
the relationship between these three worlds of culture and identity which affecting the
ordinary lives of ethnically Greek Christians. The founding of a Hellenic nation-state was
accompanied by the creation of a set of central institutions that organised and re-focused
the  elements  of  what  was  deemed  to  be  Greek.  This  did  not  necessarily  mean  that
previous  modes  of  identity  were  preempted  or  pulled  under  the  dictate  of  a  single
political  center.  The  young  Greek  state  did,  however,  assume  both  political
representation  and  cultural  leadership  of  the  dispersed  and  variegated  world  of
Hellenism43.  The new state,  in a process very similar to that  of  the Turkish national
experience to follow some 100 years  later,  produced a self-generated and nationalist
urban  bureaucracy  in  contradistinction  to  the  cosmopolitan  entrepreneurial  middle
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classes of the Ottoman-Greek realm. Concomitantly, the problem arose of who has the
most legitimate voice to be the spokesperson of “the Greek people” on the two sides of
the Aegean Sea and around the Eastern Mediterranean littoral. 
22 By the second half of the nineteenth century, individual communities residing in what
remained Ottoman territories were already drifting away from the orbit of the “millet 
system”44. In particular, ethnic Greeks who were detached from their “place of origin”
and joined the larger world of trade, commerce and bureaucracy became more attentive
of matters concerning language and religion and showed great eagerness to assert their
distinct identity in an increasingly cosmopolitan Ottoman urban culture45. For centuries,
the  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor  shared  a  social  and  political  space  as  well  as  routines  of
everyday  live  with  Muslims  and  other  Christian  communities--such  as  Armenians,
Catholic and protestant Christians from various ethnic groups, and Jews. Nevertheless, by
the closing years of the nineteenth century, what mattered most was not commonalities
but differences. The motto of the day was the survival of the individual through the
ethnic group46. Under such circumstances, narratives of Greek nationalism echoed across
the Aegean Sea and found diverse expression in cities like Constantinople and Smyrna as
well  as  the  towns  and  the  countryside.  They  combined  with  the  Megali  Idea of  the
geographic unity of all Hellenic peoples to orient the ethnically-Greek communities of
Asia Minor towards integration with this new and promising “Greek world”47. 
23 Not all the communities were influenced by Greek national revival to the same degree.
The impact of Greek national consciousness on local Greek communities' sense of their
cultural  distinctiveness  was  significantly  affected  by  their  relative  distribution--the
proportion of Christians to Muslims in their area of residence--and their location within
the imperial system. Within the borders of the Empire, more often than not, it is either
the Orthodox Patriarchate's  or the urban middle classes'  attitudes that  is  considered
worth mentioning. At one end of the spectrum of nationalist fervor, the ancient nobility
of the Phanar district in Constantinople--its superior clergy as well as the lay dignitaries
of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church--and  the  majority  of  the  established  Greek  Orthodox
merchant families were opposed to acting against the status quo. On the other side, the
enlightened and liberal class of members of the medical, legal and literary professions
were  identified  as  “most  susceptible”  to  the Greek  nationalist  call.  Still,  even  taken
together, these two groups constituted only a minor portion of the Greek population in
the Ottoman Empire. A much larger group was made up of settled rural communities
outside the Greek mainland, and artisan and laboring classes in a range of Ottoman urban
centers and towns. Those who lived in the interior of Asia Minor and were outnumbered
by Muslim or non-Greek communities were considerably far away from the centers of
Greek nationalist upheaval. However, they were not absent from the political project of
Megali Idea. It was not only the mainland Greece that was seen as integral to the history
and myths of Western European civilization48. According to both European philhellenes
and Greek nationalists, ancient Hellenic culture survived among small Greek communities
across Asia Minor. In this context, the Greeks of Asia Minor featured in the narratives of
Greek national enlightenment as crucial compact units of culture that bore witness to the
authenticity  and  continuum  of  Greek  ethnic  identity.  Local  dialects,  confessional
practices and and ways of life of Asia Minor Greeks thus became an essential part of this
standardised and official package of cultural distinctiveness disseminated by the Hellenic
Kingdom. 
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24 In summary, long before the total collapse of the imperial political system, the “Greek
subjects”  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  were  faced  with  a  difficult  choice  between  three
futures : remaining part of the Empire and changing with it in a way that secured its
continuity, following the example of their fellow nationals and struggling for territorial
independence, or finding a third alternative that allowed them both the opportunity to
entertain their newly defined ethnic identity and to reap the benefits of their position
within the empire as intermediaries in the larger world of finance, trade, and business49.
Adding to the complexity of the situation, thousands of Greek nationals--their foreign
status being an asset--migrated to the major commercial centers of the Ottoman Empire
in the course of the nineteenth century. They were drawn to the new possibilities in trade
and liberal professions that came with the integration of the Ottoman markets into the
world economy50. These migratory waves brought in new patterns of mingling between
“local” and “outside” Greeks, thereby facilitating the formation of an umbrella ethnic
Greek political identity.  Combined with community-supported educational institutions
teaching the curriculum sponsored by the Greek state across Asia Minor, Constantinople
(Istanbul),  Smyrna  (Izmir),  Trabizond  (Trabzon)  and  Caesarea  (Kayseri)  became  key
points in the matrix of a new feeling of Greek nationhood. Furthermore, the appeal of the
goal of liberating the lands of ancient heritage from “foreign forces” was unmatched in
an age of political turmoil shaking the roots of the Old World Empires of Habsburgs and
Ottomans. Competing political projects of “Greek ethnic liberation” included annexation
of Asia minor by the Greek state, replacement of the Ottoman Empire with an Hellenic
one ruled by a relative of the Orthodox Russian imperial family, or reorganisation of the
Empire into a federation of autonomous states based on ethnic lineage51. It is true that
economically or militarily there was very little that the new Greek state could do on its
own concerning the political status of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Still, plans for the
“liberation” of Asia Minor Greeks provoked enough of a nationalist fervor among the
Ottoman  bureaucratic  élites  against  the  Christian  minorities.  The  critical  issue  that
determined  the  final  solution  to  this  “problem”  of  dissident  minorities  was  that  of
“political loyalty”. Rising cadres of both the old Ottoman and the young Turkish state
were convinced that a homogeneous population in Anatolia was politically much more
viable for the establishment and running of a nation-state than a microcosmic replica of
the Ottoman millet system. It is under such an initiative that the 1922-1923 Compulsory
Population Exchanges between Greece and Turkey took place. 
25 The first wave of Greek Orthodox Christrian refugees left Asia Minor between 1912-1914.
Some others, who were moved from the coastal regions to the interior of Asia Minor as a
security measure undertaken by the Ottoman authorities, returned back to their original
settlements during the years 1918-191952. Following the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922,
however, the Greek communities who left Asia Minor during the clashes could not return
back to their land and property. As they waited their faith to be determined in mainland
Greece, the Aegean islands or other parts of the eastern Mediterranean, remaining ethnic
Greek populace of Asia Minor was then subjected to a Compulsory Population Exchange
agreed between Turkish and Greek governments. Consequently, 774 123 Greek Orthodox
refugees from Asia Minor had to be resettled in Greece by 192853. This, however, is the
lowest estimate regarding the numbers who were forced to leave Asia Minor.  Not all
refugees  resettled in Greece.  Some moved to Western Europe,  North America or  the
Middle  East.  Secondly,  there  were  deaths  and  disappearances  caused  by  the  brutal
circumstances of what perhaps could count as a civil war between Muslims and Christians
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of Asia Minor, in addition to the casualties that occurred during the long-haul Muslim
Turkish defense against invading European armies. 
26 During  the  population exchanges,  73 000  Greek Orthodox Christians  were  allowed to
remain in Istanbul as Turkish subjects and another 30 000 as Greek nationals, in addition
to 7 000 Greek Orthodox Christians on the island of Imvros and 1 200 on the island of
Tenedos54. In correspondence, 106 000 Moslems in Western Thrace were granted Greek
citizenship55.  However,  during  the  1950s,  the  lives  of  Greek  Orthodox  Christian
communities in Turkey changed dramatically. On September 6 and 7 of 1955, violent anti-
Greek riots in Istanbul led to a major exodus of the Greek communities of Istanbul56.
During these mob-lead riots, 3 000 - 4 000 Greek businesses were sacked and plundered,
churches were burnt down, Greek Orthodox cemeteries were vandalised, more than 2 000
Greek homes were robed and Greek schools were attacked. Following this first wave of
exodus from Istanbul, at the time of increased tension between Turkey and Greece over
the Cyprus issue, the Greek church press was banned and the operation of the theological
college was curtailed in 1963. By 1964, on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, the teaching
of Greek was prohibited at  schools and community ownership of  property (including
schools and churches) was forbidden57. Then came the 1964 expulsion of Greek Orthodox
Christians who had Greek citizenship on the grounds that they were a security threat to
the Turkish state58. By September 1964, an estimated 12 000 Greeks were expelled from
Turkey upon discontinuation of their residence permits. In October of the same year,
another 30 000 Turkish nationals of Greek descent were reported to have left Turkey due
to family ties and general discomfort59. Following the military confrontation of Greek and
Turkish governments in Cyprus in 1974, the situation more or less reached a deadlock.
The population of remaining Greek Orthodox communities of Asia Minor declined from
110 000 at the time of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to less than 2 500 today60
. This includes the elderly populace of less than 500 left on the islands of Imbros and
Tenedos61.
27 In the face of this sketchy portrait of the faith of Greek Orthodox Christians of Asia Minor
in  both  late  Ottoman  and  Republican  times,  it  becomes  harder  to  understand  the
nostalgia about intercommual living in a polyglot Empire shaken by the growing circles of
separatist nationalism. Certainly, in the area of arts, crafts, architecture, cooking, music,
popular culture, et cetera,  both Istanbul and other parts of Ottoman Asia Minor had a
much more cosmopolitan feel  to them before the forced departure of large Christian
communities.  In  the  meantime,  the  co-existence  of  Muslims  and  Christians  was  not
devoid of problems concerning the legitimacy of the Imperial system, lack of rights and
representation  for  the  Christian  minorities  if  they  remained  Christian,  and,  power
struggles culminating along class lines. The order of the day had to change, albeit not
necessarily in the direction of ethnic homogenisation and massive exodus of minority
groups. Still, the way things were was not satisfactory for the majority of the subjects of
the Empire,  be it  Muslim, Christian,  Jewish or secular in their attachments.  This is a
historical  fact  largely  overlooked  by  the  revivalist  movement  on  the  history  of
nationhood  in  modern  Turkey.  Similarly,  further  waves  of  exodus  that  affected  the
remaining  Christian  minorities  took  place under  the  Republican  and  not  under  the
Ottoman regime. On this subject, there is less of “remembrance of the things past” and
more  of  an  inability  to  come to  terms  with  one’s  immediate  political  history62.  The
popularisation of  Rembetika music  or  multi-cultural  cuisine of  the Ottoman times in
modern Turkish  society  and similar  causes  are  laudable  cultural  gestures in  terms  of
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protecting a heritage that is all but lost. However, as long as they are not accompanied by
guarding of the cultural and political rights of the remaining Christians, protection of
cultural and architectural sites, right of return or even visitation for those whose families
were forced to leave Asia Minor, and a general debate on the kind of citizenship contract
that the Republican regime was built upon, these gestures are forced to remain as just
that and not much beyond. 
 
Conclusion
28 Walter  Benjamin  argues  in  his  sixth  thesis  on  the  philosophy  of  history  that,  « To
articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was”. It
means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger (...). The danger
affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers »63. The danger Benjamin speaks
of is paramount in the narration of histories of nationhood. As a self-generative and self-
renewing idiom, a nation’s becoming a sovereign political unit constitutes the bedrock of
national politics64.  This kind of history is cultivated for the purposes of both cultural
survival  and  revival.  The  history  of  nationhood  is  constructed  in  response  to  the
immediate and this-worldly call  of  politics,  be  it  in the cultural,  economic or  public
spheres.  Connections  established  between  memories—whether  of  traditions,  values,
norms or communal  characteristics—and the political  project  of  sovereign statehood,
provide anchorage for the self-referential definition of the national polity. Based on an
account of “who we were, who we are and who we shall be”, the history of nationhood
articulates a current mandate for the national polity65. 
29 In this context, new takes on national history are, in a way, inevitable. With the changing
times  emerge  new  political  visions,  novel  articulations  of  culture,  and  critical
reformulations of what nationhood or citizenship mean. As the revisionist accounts of
pre-Republican, Ottoman Anatolia in modern Turkey illustrate, chronicles of older ways
of life are not just historical accounts : they are perpetually re-contextualised to speak to
the  demands  of  new  generations.  Such  reiterations  of  stories  of  national  becoming
interweave  realms  of  ethics,  politics,  culture,  economics  and  history.  There  remain
nonetheless  limits  to  re-writing  or  re-introducing  history.  Although  protagonists  of
revisionist or unorthodox politics claim the national polity as an interpretive community
and call  for  divergences  from singular  statements  of  what  the  nation is,  the  ethical
possibilities generated by such re-examinations of dominant nationalist movements are
circumscribed by the degree to which they bring together seemingly disparate parts of
the story they dare to re-member. In the Turkish case, overlooking the effects of the
tragic exodus of Muslims from areas surrounding Asia Minor into the reduced borders of
the Empire, as well as the deliberate shelving of economic, political, class and status based
cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities residing in the Empire, lead to a
romanticised look at the past. This smooth surface of memories of “the way we lived
together”, constructed primarily based on the recaptured beauty of cultural artifacts, is
not strong enough to serve as a mirror to the past of the modern Turkish nation. Early
twentieth-century Asia Minor history has plenty of bones of contention—aspects of the
millet system,  problems  concerning  the  mass  Turkification  of  Muslim  migrants  who
arrived  to  Asia  Minor,  and  the  local-level  involvement  of  the  public  in  the  forced
migrations of Christian communities to name but three. Unless such unpalatable issues
are also brought onto the table and critically introduced to the political culture of the
The Legacy of Forced Migrations in Modern Turkish Society : Remembrance of th...
Balkanologie, Vol. V, n° 1-2 | 2001
15
society,  remembrance  of  things  past  in  Asia  Minor  will  remain  merely  fine-tuned
nostalgia. It can hardly lead to a more pluralistic, less self-righteous re-embrace of the
history of the Turkish nation.
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